



# Reforming the Iraqi Interior Ministry

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*Building and reforming the Iraqi security sector remains critical to the Coalition strategy for Iraq.*

*All previous Coalition timelines for security transition have been characterised by over-optimism and self-delusion.*

*There is undeniable progress but, we need to address:*

- *Technical proficiency*
- *Institutional development*
- *Politics*

# Understanding the MOI



- Technical
  - Previous tasks = civil govt & low-level policing in a stable environment; new tasks are light-years removed; a low skills base
- Institutional
  - A bureaucratic backwater with simple, routine admin of 60,000 personnel (but hollowed out); now managing some 400,000 in a very complex environment
- Political
  - Has been at the centre of Iraq's struggle for political power – a prize and an arena

# Agenda



- The political environment
- Implications for the MOI
- The politics of the MOI

# The Surge



- The surge has had some successes; where next?
- What was the surge strategy?
  - Stop seeing GOI as the solution but as one part of the problem; use all our resources to intrusively shape Iraqi political landscape
  - Combine bottom-up and top-down steps to political accommodation
  - (temporarily) reverse transition - use CF to squeeze accelerants and to protect population
  - Boost state capacity for service delivery

# A post-surge strategy?



- Looking back from 2010 (new govt), we want to have shrunk the number of groups competing for power outside the political process. This may be either via a national unity govt including Sunnis or by a “loyal opposition”
  - i.e. reduce ISCI/Badr and Daawa influence in favour of emerging Sunni representatives (via provincial and national elections and CLC programmes). Arguably – also greater Sadrist political role?
- This needs to be underpinned by a more capable state able to deliver law and order and services more efficiently and more equitably
- ... And neighbours who are at least not pulling the country apart; ideally are helping to push it together

# The Coming Political Battle



- 2003-5: dismantled existing power structures and encouraged/allowed ISCI/Badr, Daawa and KDP/PUK to take power.
  - Though we've made intermittent efforts at, e.g. Sunni outreach since fall 2003
- 2007 has been a transitional year. Going forward, we're still supporting ISCI/Daawa but also seeking to get them to share power and resources at the levels of national politics, local politics, ministries, security services and service delivery
- But – what does this really mean in terms of wider sharing of state resources (e.g. Sahwa and JAM in police ...)

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# Technical proficiency



- Numbers, training, equipment, enablers, etc
- There is undeniable progress in most areas but this will require continued heavy investment by the Coalition and GOI over many years
- We have rowed back on Casey/Abizaid’s “rush to transition” but continue to thrust unrealistic tasks on forces that are not ready
  - We continue to over-prioritise the MOD/IA rather than the – more important – ROL institutions
- Our capacity to deliver appropriate, prioritised and targeted support has improved but remains sub-optimal

# Institutional development



- Patchy progress
  - Ministerial capacity
  - GOI-wide capacities (finance, personnel, inter-ministerial coordination, etc)
  - Centre-province linkages
- Coalition could do much better at delivering this support but there are no quick-fixes

# Security Sector Politics



- A mixed bag
  - Ministries carved up on political grounds (e.g. within MOI) and ISF and intelligence agencies used as patronage and enforcement networks
  - At provincial/local levels, political affiliations tend to trump national “professionalism”
  - But there are countervailing pressures (reinforced by the Coalition) as professional officers feel (some) loyalty to “Iraq”
- Centre-province tug of war
  - Operations centres
  - Provincial Powers Law/CPA 71

# The Carve-up



- MOD/IA
  - Shiification; peshmerga role but intrusive Coalition presence at all levels
- MOI
  - ISCI/Badr-Daawa balance at centre, JAM role in provinces.
  - Generational change via new officers?
  - CLCs in Sunni areas
- Intelligence agencies
  - MSNSA, INIS

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# Impact of our political strategy



- Our transition plan depends on the MOI building technical and institutional capability and operating in a more politically even-handed manner
  - This is (slowly) happening
- In 2008-9, we shall be seeking to upset the existing power-structures at the national and local levels:
  - In 2008-9, we shall be pushing for more Sunni inclusion in the ISF and more even-handed actions (e.g. prosecution of sectarian officers)
- We should assume the incumbents will use their resources to hold onto power.

# The Flashpoints



- Daawa, ISCI/Badr and JAM may intensify their competition for influence within the MOI/IPS
- How far can Sunni CLC incorporation into the MOI/IPS go?
- What role will the Kurds retain in the MOD and MOI?
  - Key “pesh” IA units and senior positions; MOI overwatch
- How far can JAM militants be “cleansed” from the Facilities Protection Service?
- How will the tussle over the intelligence services be resolved?
- What will emerge in terms of centre-local security relationships in light of: Provincial Powers Law, political reality after provincial elections and de facto military rule?

# Bottom Line



- Partnership with and technical assistance to the ISF (increasingly focused on higher-end ID) will continue to be needed
  - we need to raise our game in delivering this
  - ... and to be much more realistic of the likely speed of change
- Our (necessary) political strategy will however lead to further turmoil and tensions within the MOI



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